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BUSINESS, THE ROBERTS COURT, AND THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT'S RECENT BUSINESS DECISIONS MAY
NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH
Sri Srinivasan* and Bradley W. Joondeph**
INTRODUCTION
It has almost become clich6 to call the Roberts Court a
friend of American business. From antitrust to punitive
damages to securities regulation to preemption, the
conventional wisdom seems to hold that the current Justices
have shaped federal law in ways favorable to commercial
enterprise. Nonetheless, especially during the 2007-2008
Term, the Court has also handed down a number of decisions
favoring plaintiffs (such as employees or consumers) at the
expense of business litigants-decisions that have led some
observers to conclude that characterizations of the Roberts
Court as "pro-business" are "far too simplistic."'
One complication in drawing firm conclusions about the
Roberts Court's approach to business issues is that the
current group of Justices has served together for only three
years. There simply is not much of a track record from which
to draw strong inferences. A more fundamental complication
is that other explanatory variables-influences other than a
decision's import for American businesses-are certainly at
play. This essay explores one such variable that may have
been especially significant over the past three years: the
* Partner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington D.C.
** Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. The authors are grateful for the
outstanding assistance provided by Anton Metlitsky and Brandon Douglass, as
well as the very helpful comments from Kyle Graham.
1. Gina Passarella, Former SG Knocks Pro-Business Label for High Court,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1202423032918.
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
content of the arguments presented to the Court by the
Solicitor General.
It is well known that the Solicitor General is an
influential advocate at the Court. And it stands to reason
that the views of the Solicitor General for the Bush
administration may have been received especially favorably
by the current group of Justices: seven of the Roberts Court's
members were appointed by Republican presidents, and two
were appointed by President George W. Bush himself. As a
result, there was apt to be a fair measure of ideological
affinity between the views of the Roberts Court and positions
taken by the Bush administration's Solicitor General.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the basic commitments of
the modern Republican Party, the Bush administration
frequently filed briefs as amicus curiae supporting business
litigants. But on a number of occasions, the federal
government weighed in against business interests and in
support of employees or consumers. And when it did, the
Roberts Court nearly always ruled against the interests of
business and in favor of the position advocated by the United
States. How are we to understand this pattern? Does it
suggest that the Roberts Court is actually more pro-
government than pro-business? Alternatively, does it reflect
a meaningful moderation in the Court's sympathy for
business interests? Or does it signify something else still?
We suggest that the answer may be all or none of the
above-in essence, that these decisions leave much
unrevealed. Specifically, given the Bush administration's
well-known reputation as a strong ally of business, its
arguments against the interests of business likely carried a
great deal of credibility with the Court. Consequently,
decisions by the Roberts Court siding against business
litigants, but in favor of the Solicitor General, may show only
that the arguments of business litigants in those cases went
beyond what the law could permit. At the same time, the
Court's siding with the government in business cases may not
illustrate the Solicitor General's influence per se as much as it
reflects the general agreement between the Justices and the
Bush administration on how best to resolve the legal
questions at issue. Hence, the decisions may not tell us much
about the Roberts Court's underlying attitudes towards
business or the federal government-that is, whether, and
1104 [Vol:49
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20091 DECISIONS MAY NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH 1105
the extent to which, it is enduringly "pro-business" or "pro-
government."
This essay presents an empirical examination of the full
universe of the Roberts Court's decisions affecting the
interests of business from January 2006, when Justice Alito
joined the Court, to January 2009. As a purely descriptive
matter, we find that the Court tended to reach results
favorable to business interests, and that it tended to adopt
the positions urged by the Bush administration. Moreover,
when those two positions diverged-most saliently, in cases
where the United States and the United States Chamber of
Commerce filed opposing amicus briefs-the Roberts Court
overwhelmingly sided with the government.
While these findings are interesting, our basic thesis is
that there is no simple way to interpret these outcomes.
Rather, it likely will take a different cohort of decisions to
bring the Roberts Court's general attitudes towards business
and the federal government to the surface. Most assume the
Obama administration will be less ideologically aligned with
the current Justices than the Bush administration, and less
apt to side with business interests on questions of federal law.
If this comes to pass-and the Obama administration's
Solicitor General argues for outcomes contrary to business
interests in a number of cases-it may then be possible to
reach more definitive conclusions about the Roberts Court's
responsiveness to American business and the federal
government.
I. BUSINESS, THE ROBERTS COURT, AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
In a New York Times Magazine article written roughly a
year ago, Jeffrey Rosen profiled the United States Chamber
of Commerce and its increasing success in persuading the
Supreme Court through its amicus filings to render decisions
congenial to American business. The article, which begins by
noting that the "affinities between" the Supreme Court's
building and the Chamber's headquarters "seem to be more
2. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM
(Magazine) at 38.
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
than just architectural,"3 chronicles the history of the
Chamber's efforts to influence the Court, and explains at
length that the Chamber seems now to exert more influence
than ever before. For example, Rosen notes, "[allthough the
Court is currently accepting less than 2 percent of the 10,000
petitions it receives each year, the Chamber of Commerce's
petitions between 2004 and 2007 were granted at a rate of 26
percent."4 "And ever since John Roberts was appointed Chief
Justice in 2005," Rosen observes, "the Court has seemed only
more receptive to business concerns. "'
This perception of the Roberts Court as an institution
increasingly aligned with business interests is widely shared.
Indeed, it is conventional media wisdom that, with the
additions of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice
Samuel Alito, the newly constituted Court has been "good for
business."6 The Roberts Court is viewed by some as " 'even
better for business' than the Court led for two decades by the
late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist."7
While the views expressed in Rosen's article and other
press accounts have largely remained confined to the domain
of commentators and editorial boards, the image of the
Roberts Court as "reflexively pro-business"-as the New York
Times editorial board phrased it'-has occasionally caught
the attention of elected officials as well. The best example
may be the reaction to the Supreme Court's five-to-four
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.9 The
Court sided with Goodyear in holding that Lilly Ledbetter, a
former Goodyear employee who alleged that she for years had
been paid less than her male counterparts doing the same job,
was too late in bringing suit for sex discrimination under




6. David G. Savage, High Court Is Good for Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
2007, at Al; see also Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to
Weigh Right to Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at B1 (labeling the Roberts
Court as "one of the most pro-business [Courts] in 50 years").
7. Savage, supra note 6 (quoting Maureen Mahoney, a leading Supreme
Court advocate).
8. Editorial, The Court and Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at A18.
9. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 618 (2007).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
1106 [Vo1:49
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2009] DECISIONS MAY NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH 1107
was supported by the Chamber of Commerce."
In the wake of Ledbetter, the New York Times editorial
board, with a headline titled Injustice 5, Justice 4, decried
that the "ruling is the latest indication that a Court that once
proudly stood up for the disadvantaged is increasingly
protective of the powerful." 2 But the view that the Court had
moved too far to the side of business extended beyond
editorial boards and commentators. Ledbetter's case also
drew the attention of Congress, and led to the passage in the
House of Representatives of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2007,'" intended to overrule the Court's decision. Although
the bill initially stalled in the Senate in the face of
Republican (and Bush administration) opposition, a new
Congress passed the bill in January 2009 and President
Obama signed it into law.'4
The Ledbetter case illustrates a potential-and little-
noted-wrinkle in the widely accepted view that the Roberts
Court is "reflexively pro-business," for there was one party in
Ledbetter and other business cases with which the Roberts
Court has sided even more than the Chamber of
Commerce: the United States. As has often happened in
cases in which the business community has an interest in the
outcome of a case, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief
in Ledbetter supporting the business side, 5 the position that
prevailed.
The importance of the Solicitor General-and the
positions that he or she takes-in Supreme Court litigation is
well-established. One Court observer has noted that
[tihe Court plainly provides the Solicitor General's legal
arguments with heightened respect because of the nature
of his client-the United States-and the deference that
the judicial branch naturally owes in many legal settings
to the views of counsel representing the interests of the
11. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
and the Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (No. 05-1074).
12. Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18.
13. Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (1997).
14. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at Al.
15. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (No. 05-1074).
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
two other branches of government. 6
It is no wonder that the Solicitor General is often referred to
as the "Tenth Justice." 7
Although the media's general characterization of the
Roberts Court as "pro-business," and its focus on the
influence of the Chamber of Commerce, has generally left the
role of the Solicitor General unaddressed, the position taken
by the United States gained wide attention in at least one
recent business case, Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C.
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.'8 The issue in Stoneridge arose
from the Court's 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.' 9 The Court in
Central Bank held that private actions under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act of 1934, the "catchall provision"" that
generally prohibits securities fraud,2' fail to encompass aiding
or abetting securities fraud. The courts of appeals
subsequently split over whether so-called "scheme liability"-
that is, the ability of an injured investor "to recover from a
party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates
a duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to
violate" 22-nevertheless falls within the scope of section
10(b).2 3
In the lower courts, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") had taken the position that "scheme
liability" claims were actionable by private parties as
16. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487,
1493 (2008).
17. See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987).
18. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761 (2008).
19. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994).
20. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
22. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
23. Compare Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that 'scheme liability" was actionable under section 10(b)),
vacated, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct.
1119 (2008), with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA),
Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting "scheme liability" theory of
securities fraud), and In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987
(2006).
1108 [Vol:49
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20091 DECISIONS MAY NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH 1109
securities fraud.24 But while the SEC, as an "independent"
agency, has independent litigation authority from the
Department of Justice in lower courts, it lacks such
independent authority in the Supreme Court.25  Thus, after
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits in Stoneridge-billed by Linda
Greenhouse of the New York Times as "one of the most closely
watched business cases in years"26-a change in the
government's litigation position was a distinct possibility.
The importance of which side the Solicitor General would
support escaped neither the media nor elected officials.
Indeed, after the deadline for amicus briefs to be filed in
support of the plaintiff-petitioners had passed-and it became
clear that the government would side with business interests
or with neither side-Senator Dodd, the Democratic
Chairman of the Finance Committee, sent a letter to the
Justice Department urging it to refrain from filing a brief in
support of the business side (i.e., the respondents), a position
for which the Wall Street Journal editorial board strongly
criticized him." And when the United States did file a brief
supporting the respondents, the press was not alone in taking
note,28 as both sitting senators and congressmen, as well as
former SEC commissioners, moved to present late-filed
amicus briefs supporting the petitioner.29
The belief that the Solicitor General's position in
Stoneridge would be highly influential may well have been
correct. The Court sided in favor of the respondent
businesses, the Chamber, and the government, holding that
24. See Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Positions that Favor
Appellant, Simpson, 452 F.3d 1040 (No. 04-55665).
25. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General
Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-65 (1994).
26. Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically, Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2007, at C1.
27. See Editorial, Guilt by Contact, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2007, at A10.
28. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Bush Sides with Business over Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 16, 2007, at A4.
29. See Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae after the Filing
Deadline and Brief Amici Curiae of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr. and
Barney Frank, in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43); Motion for Leave to
File Brief out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC Comm'rs in
Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43).
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"scheme liability" claims fall outside the scope of section
10(b).10 Indeed, while both the respondents and the Chamber
argued that "scheme liability" fail to satisfy numerous
elements of a private cause of action under section 10(b),3 1 the
Solicitor General's argument rested on only one-a failure to
show the element of "reliance."32 And that is precisely what
the Court held.3
So do the Roberts Court's decisions in business cases
indicate that the Court in fact is pro-business, as is typically
assumed, or is the Court instead pro-government? To be
sure, it often may not make any difference. In cases during
the Roberts Court in which both the United States and the
Chamber of Commerce have filed amicus briefs supporting
one party over the other, the Solicitor General and the
Chamber have advocated for the same disposition on a
majority of occasions . 4 That may be unsurprising given that,
throughout the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, the Solicitor General's client has been an
administration considered sympathetic to business interests.
But the Solicitor General and the Chamber have not always
been aligned. And when the Solicitor General and the
Chamber have disagreed about the proper disposition of a
case as amici curiae, the Court has overwhelmingly sided
with the Solicitor General, a point to which we now turn.
II. OUR STUDY
A. Methodology
To explore the comparative strengths of business
interests and the Solicitor General in affecting the Court's
decisions, we devised a simple empirical study of the Roberts
30. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
31. See generally Brief for Respondents, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-
43); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-
43).
32. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance
at 17-26, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43).
33. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770 ("[We conclude respondents' deceptive
acts, which were not disclosed to the investing public, are too remote to satisfy
the requirement of reliance.").
34. See infra Part II.B.
[Vol:491110
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2009] DECISIONS MAY NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH 1111
Court's business-related decisions. We constructed a unique
data set of every business-related decision handed down by
the Supreme Court between January 31, 2006, when Samuel
Alito was sworn in as Associate Justice, and February 1,
2009.31 For each decision, we coded the Court's judgment and
each individual Justice's vote as either supporting or
opposing the result more favorable to business. 6 We also
coded each case for whether the United States had
participated, either as a party or as amicus curiae, and
whether the United States had supported the result favorable
or unfavorable to business. Finally, we coded each case for
whether the United States Chamber of Commerce had
participated, 37  a reasonable indication of the decision's
importance to the business community, and the salience of
the business aspect of the case to the Justices.
As is inevitably the case when creating a data set of this
sort, a party's position in a particular case-or the Court's
decision-may defy ready categorization. As one example, in
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing," the
petitioner, supported by the Chamber of Commerce, argued
that coordinated activity by members of an underwriting
syndicate pursuant to the securities laws was immune from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws. The Solicitor General,
while supporting the petitioner in many respects, filed a brief
supporting neither party because the government would have
35. The complete data set (as a Microsoft Excel file) and accompanying
codebook are available for download at the following address: http://claranet.scu
.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=2525&page=docs.
36. We constructed the data set in the following manner:
First, we examined the Supreme Court's decisions in the United States
Reports in chronological order, beginning in January 2006, to determine which
cases addressed issues of significance to the business community. We excluded
those decisions in which significant business interests were represented on both
sides of a case, as such cases would be unhelpful in exploring a "pro-business" or
"anti-business" disposition.
Second, we coded the decisions for various conditions. The most significant
were (1) whether the outcome was favorable to business interests; (2) whether
the votes of each individual Justice were favorable to business interests; (3)
whether the United States participated, as a party or as amicus; (4) whether the
position advocated by the United States was favorable to business interests; and
(5) whether the Chamber of Commerce participated in the case.
37. In most cases where the Chamber participated, it did so as amicus
curiae. In one case included in the data set, Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008), the Chamber was actually a party.
38. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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allowed a remand to permit the plaintiff-respondents to
amend their complaint.39 The Court sided with the petitioner
(and the Chamber), and did not afford any opportunity for an
amendment of the complaint.40 While the Solicitor General
and the Chamber of Commerce disagreed on the question
whether the plaintiff-respondents should have been given a
chance to amend their complaint, we treat the case as one in
which the Solicitor General and the Chamber were in
agreement because the government's position ultimately was
much closer to that of petitioner and the Chamber than that
of the plaintiff-respondents. (As one indication, the
government divided argument time with the petitioner rather
than the respondent.) While certain other cases similarly
defied immediate categorization, such cases were few in
number, and in most instances, the proper coding was
straightforward.
B. Results
During the three years between January 30, 2006, and
February 1, 2009, the Supreme Court handed down sixty-six
decisions on the merits addressing legal issues directly
relevant to American businesses where one of the possible
outcomes was identifiably favorable to business.4 Overall,
the Roberts Court reached outcomes favorable to business
interests in forty-three (or 65.2%) of these cases. The United
States Chamber of Commerce filed a brief as amicus curiae in
thirty-nine of these sixty-six cases, and it was the litigating
party in one additional case. In these forty cases, the Court
reached the result advocated by the Chamber in twenty-six
(or 65.0%) of its decisions, roughly the same rate at which it
found in favor of business interests overall.
39. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur
at 28, Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (No. 05-1157).
40. Billing, 127 S. Ct. at 2397.
41. Over this time frame, the Court also decided a number of cases in which
the question presented involved opposing business interests, such that certain
business groups were involved on both sides. (A good example is Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).) We excluded these cases from our
study because, though they obviously are business related, they cannot offer any
insight into whether the Roberts Court has been favorable to 'business
interests" writ large.
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The Office of the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
Bush administration, filed a brief as amicus curiae in thirty-
seven business-related cases (as defined above) over this
same time frame, supporting the result favorable to business
in twenty (or 54.1%) of these cases. There were a total of
twenty-seven cases in which the United States and the
United States Chamber of Commerce both participated as
amicus curiae, and they advocated the same position in
thirteen (48.1%) of these cases. In addition, there were four
cases in which the government was a party and the Chamber
of Commerce weighed in against the government,42 and one
case in which the government was a party and the Chamber
sided with the government.43
Table 1. Win rates for business interests in business-related
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court under various
conditions, January 30, 2006, to February 1, 2009.
Proportion of
Number of Decisions Favoring
Condition Decisions Business Interests (%)
All business-related 66 65.2
cases
Chamber of Commerce 40 65.0
participated
Chamber of Commerce 8 100.0
participated but
United States did not
Chamber of Commerce 14 92.9
and United States
agreed
Chamber of Commerce 18 27.8
and United States
disagreed
Perhaps most interesting for our purposes is what
happened in the fourteen cases in which the Bush
42. These cases are United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331
(2007), Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007), FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715 (2006).
43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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administration and the Chamber of Commerce advocated
opposing positions as amici curiae. Here, the Court sided
with the government, and against the Chamber, in thirteen of
the fourteen cases--every case other than Allison Engine Co.
v. United States ex rel Sanders." Thus, although the Court
reached the result favored by the Chamber in roughly two-
thirds of its business cases overall, it did so only once in the
fourteen cases where its view was opposed by the Bush
administration in an amicus brief.
Table 2. Win rates for the United States government in business-
related decisions handed down by the Supreme Court under various
conditions, January 30, 2006, to February 1, 2009.
Proportion of Decisions
Number of Favoring Government's
Condition Decisions Position (%)
United States 47 78.7
participated
United States 10 30.0
participated as a party
United States 37 91.9
participated as amicus
curiae




In contrast, the Court reached the result favorable to
business interests in all thirteen cases in which the Solicitor
General and the Chamber argued for the same outcome as
amici, in four of the five cases in which the Chamber
participated and the government was a party, and in all eight
cases in which the Chamber participated but the Bush
administration did not. In other words, the Chamber
prevailed in twenty-five of the twenty-six business cases in
which the Solicitor General did not file an amicus brief
supporting the other side. Interestingly, although the Court
overwhelmingly adopted the position advocated by the
44. Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
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Solicitor General as amicus when the government disagreed
with the Chamber, the Court sided with the Chamber in all
four cases in which the government and the Chamber
disagreed and the government was a party.
Table 3. Proportion of votes for outcomes favoring business
interests by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in business-
related decisions handed down by the Supreme Court under various
conditions, January 30, 2006, to February 1, 2009.
Condition Roberts (%) Alito (%)
All business-related decisions 66.7 67.2
(N=64) (N=58)
Chamber of Commerce 67.5 64.7
participated (N=40) (N=34)
United States did not 95.5 100.0
participate or agreed with (N=22) (N=17)
Chamber
Chamber of Commerce and 33.3 29.4
United States disagreed (N=18) (N=17)
Chamber of Commerce and 14.3 7.7
United States disagreed as (N=14) (N=13)
amicus curiae
As one might have expected, the voting records of the two
new Justices-Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-were
almost a perfect reflection of the results produced by the
Court as a whole. As table 3 illustrates, both tended to vote
for outcomes favorable to business interests, especially so
when the Chamber of Commerce filed a brief in the case and
the United States either supported the Chamber's position or
did not participate. (Indeed, Justice Alito has yet to vote
against the Chamber under these conditions.) But Roberts
and Alito-like the Court as a whole-voted quite differently
in cases in which the Solicitor General opposed business
litigants, especially when he did so as an amicus.
III. DISCUSSION
Before discussing the possible implications of these
results, a few cautionary notes are in order. First, in many
senses it is overly simplistic to evaluate the Court's decisions
along the dimension of "pro-business" or "anti-business."
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While these tags might be helpful as very general descriptors,
they do not capture the various and nuanced ways in which
the Justices actually understand and decide the cases before
them. Though the consequences of a given decision for
commercial enterprise may well affect the Justices' choices,
either consciously or unconsciously, their decision making is
certainly influenced by a number of other perspectives
bearing on the case, such as their views about the proper
scope of national power in a preemption case or the problem
of racial or gender discrimination in an employment case.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that these other
considerations are often more immediately salient to the
Justices than a given decision's impact on business. This
might help explain a commonality among many of the cases
that the Roberts Court decided against the Chamber. Nine of
the twelve cases in which the Court sided with the
government and against the Chamber where both
participated as amicus curiae involved employment
discrimination, labor, or ERISA issues. Here, the Court's
decisions may well have been largely determined by factors
unrelated to the cases' implications for American businesses,
such as the Justices' views about racial or gender
discrimination, about the employment relationship more
generally, or about the specific statutory provisions in
question. In short, "pro-business" or "anti-business" might
have limited currency as meaningful labels in explaining the
Court's work.
Second, a simple empirical study like ours merely counts
the number of outcomes going in one direction or the other. It
therefore treats each decision as equally significant, without
any weighting to account for their relative importance.
Insofar as the Court might act differently in business cases
depending on a legal issue's greater or lesser significance to
the business community-no doubt, a plausible hypothesis-
our analysis would fail to capture that phenomenon.
Third, our study merely measures the "win rates" of
particular actors-business litigants, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the United States-in cases decided by the
Supreme Court on the merits. Though helpful as a rough
gauge, such a measure can nonetheless be misleading as an
indication of the Justices' underlying attitudes because it
necessarily depends on the mix of cases the Court decides.
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For example, due to the independent choices made by
litigants, the lower courts, and the Justices at the certiorari
stage, it is conceivable that the pool of business cases decided
by the Court over the past three years disproportionately
involved lower court judgments that were generally favorable
to plaintiffs. If so, the Court could have decided a majority of
these cases in favor of business litigants while still holding a
generally pro-plaintiff, anti-business disposition. In other
words, decisional outcomes are a product of not just the
Justices' votes but also the questions presented. Because the
frame set by those questions might be slanted in one direction
or another, win rates represent a somewhat adulterated
reflection of the Justices' underlying views.
With these caveats in mind, a cursory review of our
results still lends a modicum of support to the conventional
wisdom that the Roberts Court is friendly to the interests of
American business. Over the past three years, business
litigants have prevailed in roughly sixty-four percent of the
Court's decisions on the merits. But a closer examination of
the data-particularly one that considers the success in these
cases of the Solicitor General-makes it much more difficult
to determine whether the current Court has actually been
"pro-business."
Unsurprisingly, the Bush administration tended to
support the position favored by business interests, though
perhaps not as often as one might have expected. Of course,
it may be that, while the Bush administration only supported
the Chamber of Commerce in roughly half of the cases in
which they both participated as amici, it did so
disproportionately in the most significant cases. Indeed,
David Franklin makes a persuasive case in his article for this
symposium that the cases that the Chamber has lost before
the Roberts Court (i.e., the ones in which the government has
opposed the Chamber) have tended to be less important to the
business community.45
More interesting-and more important to ascertaining
whether the Roberts Court has been "pro-business" or "pro-
government"-is what happened in those cases in which the
45. See David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court?
Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019 (2009).
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Chamber and the Solicitor General opposed one another. The
Bush administration's reputation as a proponent of business
interests suggests that, when it took a position before the
Court against the interests of business, those arguments
would have carried a fair measure of credibility with the
Justices. And our study seems to bear this out: although the
Chamber prevailed in twenty-one of the twenty-two cases in
which the government either supported the Chamber or did
not participate, the Chamber lost in thirteen of the fourteen
cases in which the Solicitor General supported the other side
as amicus curiae. The government's success rate in these
fourteen cases is tempered somewhat by its poor showing in
the four cases in which it was a principal party and the
Chamber filed an opposing amicus brief. But even if we
consider all of the cases in which the government participated
(whether as a party or as amicus), the Solicitor General still
fared quite well when it opposed the Chamber, prevailing in
more than seventy-two percent of such cases.46
The potential influence of the Solicitor General in the
Roberts Court's resolution of business cases complicates any
conclusions we might draw about the current Court's general
disposition towards business interests. It suggests that the
Court has cared as much-and perhaps more-about the
views of the federal government as those of the business
community. Indeed, the recent spate of cases going against
business interests and in favor of the government perhaps
could be seen to indicate that the Roberts Court is more "pro-
government" than "pro-business," and that the Court's
sympathy for commercial enterprise may actually be
46. There may be room for debate on whether the cases in which the
government appears as an amicus shed more light on the significance of the
government's position than cases in which the government is a principal party.
To a certain extent, the government has greater freedom to shape its position
when it appears as an amicus: the government will not have been involved in
the litigation as a party and therefore will not be constrained by any positions
taken in prior proceedings in the case; and conversely, when the government is
a party to the proceedings, it generally defends a favorable result unless there is
no reasonable argument supporting it. The difference in the government's
freedom to develop its position may be limited, however, because the
government's views as an amicus will necessarily be shaped by the
government's position in previous cases raising similar issues, the relevant
administrative positions taken by a government agency, and the government's
institutional interests.
1118 [Vo1:49
HeinOnline -- 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1118 2009
8 A    l  
   l   
 's  t  
 t   t  
t t    t  
 i   t   
    
 iled  - e   t    
t r ted    
,   t   t  
    l    
 's   
      
    i l   
r      
    t te  
  l  
 t   i   
 t    4  
 t ti l i l    li it  l i   
     t s  
     l 
     t   
t   s t  
 t  
 t   t 
 ts    t  
      
 ,"    
 l rise    
. r    r  f r t   t r t  s i  i  t  
t            
t's i     nt i al  
i      ition 
      t       
      i  i s 
   ings    t  
    i s,    l  t   
le      '  
 t  l   iti    li it , ,   
t's  s rily   
t's iti  i i  s i i  i il  i ,  l ant 
trative  t   t's 
it tional  
20091 DECISIONS MAY NOT REVEAL VERY MUCH 1119
moderating.
But these conclusions, too, are problematic. As to the
influence of the Solicitor General, there are three problems in
concluding that the Roberts Court is "pro-government" in
business-related cases. First, there was likely a pre-existing
ideological affinity between the Roberts Court and the Bush
administration. After all, two of the Justices currently
serving on the Court were nominated by President George W.
Bush, and five of the remaining seven Justices were
appointed by Republican Presidents.47  Thus, when the
Solicitor General argued for certain positions, the Court was
apt to be receptive. In other words, the win rate of the
Solicitor General may simply reflect the fact that the Court
and the Bush administration tended to see these legal issues
the same way.
Second, as discussed above, given the Bush
administration's ideological reputation, its arguments against
business likely had a fair measure of credibility with the
Court. To some extent, they represented arguments against
ideological interest, and thus carried a special imprimatur of
reliability. Thus, the Solicitor General may have been
influential, but more due to the administration's ideological
reputation than a general inclination by the Roberts Court to
side with the federal government.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the Solicitor
General's record was hardly perfect. Specifically, in all four
cases in which the government was a principal party (rather
than an amicus) and was opposed by the Chamber, the Court
ruled against the Solicitor General and in favor of the
Chamber's position.
Taken together, these considerations mean that the
results of our study cannot be taken to show that the Solicitor
General's views are more important to the Roberts Court
than those of the business community. To make the point
more concretely, the Roberts Court's responsiveness to
47. See Rosen, supra note 2. For the most part, Justice Breyer's record
seems to have borne out these views. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346 (2007) (opinion for the Court of Breyer, J.) (holding that punitive
damages award based on third-party harm was precluded by the Due Process
Clause); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (opinion for the
Court of Breyer, J.) (holding that District of Columbia tort law is preempted by
federal statute).
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arguments presented by the Obama administration-
particularly if and when the Solicitor General takes positions
unfavorable to business-might differ markedly from what
we saw during the Bush administration.
Moreover, we should not necessarily interpret the
Chamber's recent string of losses as an indication that the
Roberts Court's "pro-business" predisposition (to the extent it
actually exists) has waned. After all, in nearly every case the
Chamber has lost during the tenure of the Roberts Court, a
reputedly pro-business Bush administration opposed the
Chamber. These decisions may therefore indicate little more
than that, although the Court is favorably inclined towards
business interests, it is not so favorably inclined as to rule for
business litigants even when an apparently pro-business
government argues that the law will not permit such a
result.' In other words, the Chamber's losses may only
testify to a very strong signaling effect attached to anti-
business arguments presented by a Republican Solicitor
General.
CONCLUSION
In the end, much remains uncertain about the degree to
which the Roberts Court is influenced by the views of the
business community or the federal government. To the extent
such descriptors like "pro-business" or "pro-government" are
meaningful, it is too soon to tell whether the Roberts Court is
one or the other, neither, or both. For example, the Court's
2007 Term, which included decisions such as Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.49 and Chamber of Commerce v. Brown5°-
decisions agreeing with the Solicitor General that the
48. This point has not evaded the press. As Linda Greenhouse wrote after
witnessing an oral argument in which she believed that the Court would side
against employees even when the government supported them: "Beneath the
surface of a Supreme Court argument on Monday in a case of job-related age
discrimination was a surprising question: has the Supreme Court drifted so far
toward the employer's side in job discrimination cases that it is now to the right
of the Bush administration?" Linda Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in
a Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A26. As it turns out, the
Court unanimously accepted the government's general position in that case.
See Sprint[United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1147 (2008).
49. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
50. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
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relevant state law claims were preempted-led many to
conclude that the Justices were sympathetic to business
litigants' expansive conceptions of federal preemption. But
the Court's recent 2008 Term decisions in Altria Group, Inc.
v. Good5 and Wyeth v. Levine52-both of which rejected
preemption claims in important contexts, one consistent with
the position of the Solicitor General and one in opposition to
it-have muddled the picture considerably. Perhaps the
supposed "preemption wave" has crested, even when the
federal government supports such claims. Or perhaps the
"cwave" was always more perception than reality.
Regardless, it is possible the picture will grow clearer in
the near future. We may learn a fair amount as the Roberts
Court begins to render decisions in a new ideological
environment, responding to arguments presented by a federal
government presumably with a different set of legal policy
priorities. Because the Court is apt to be less ideologically
aligned with the Obama administration than it was with the
Bush administration-and because the new Solicitor
General's arguments against business interests are unlikely
to have the same signaling effect to the Justices as those of
the past administration-upcoming decisions pitting the
Chamber of Commerce against the Obama administration
might well afford us a new, more illuminating perspective on
these questions. Time will tell.
51. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that state law
consumer fraud claims concerning the marketing of cigarettes as "light" or "low
tar" are not expressly preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act or
impliedly preempted by the regulatory actions of the Federal Trade
Commission).
52. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that the Food and Drug
Administration's approval of a pharmaceutical as "safe and effective" with a
specific warning label does not preempt state tort failure-to-warn claims).
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